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INTRODUCTION 
In July 2009, the Obama Administration proposed legislation that 
would create a Consumer Financial Protection Agency (“CFPA”).  Among 
other items, the proposed legislation would eliminate federal preemption of 
state consumer protection laws, which would encourage states to 
reintroduce a scattering of local rules and regulations.  Federal rules 
promulgated by the newly created Consumer Financial Protection Agency 
would override “weaker” state laws, but the states would be free to adopt 
“stricter” laws.  The National Bank Act (“NBA”) and the Home Owners’ 
Loan Act (“HOLA”) would be amended to apply state consumer protection 
laws to national banks and federally chartered savings institutions.  In 
addition, the NBA and HOLA would be amended to provide that their 
respective “visitorial” provisions would not prevent a state Attorney 
General’s enforcement of federal or state law. 
The legislation is an outgrowth of a recent—though largely non-
economic—literature linking preemption to much of what ails the U.S. 
banking industry, including the subprime mortgage crisis.  In Part I of this 
report, we briefly review the preemption debate, beginning with the 
passage of the National Bank Act of 1864.  A review of the Supreme 
Court’s decisions in preemption cases reveals that the Court has, based on 
statute and legal precedent, both implicitly and explicitly promoted 
economic efficiency through preemption.  Through such rulings, the Court 
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reduced local state efforts to erect barriers to competition, the denial of 
which increased consumer welfare and economic efficiency. 
Next, we review the economic case for and against preemption.  When 
preemption is considered from an economic efficiency standpoint, its 
merits become apparent.  We review the literature supporting the OCC’s 
regulatory policy.  We also provide data showing that the overwhelming 
majority of subprime mortgage loans were originated by companies that 
were not subject to preemption, further undermining the argument that 
preemption is to blame for the subprime crisis.  Our findings are 
corroborated by a recent white paper issued by the Treasury, noting that 
94% of “high-priced loans” to “lower income borrowers” were originated 
by lenders not covered by the Community Reinvestment Act.  Finally, we 
review the arguments put forward by critics of preemption.  The arguments 
against preemption are generally characterized by a failure to consider the 
economic benefits of preemption and a lack of empirical validation. 
In Part II, we analyze the economic benefits of preemption using 
examples from actual OCC interventions, academic studies, and case 
studies from industries with similar regulatory situations.  We identify four 
specific economic benefits of preemption.  First, preemption eliminates 
state-sponsored protectionism.  We review the OCC’s record of intervening 
to ensure that states do not protect local industries from out-of-state banks 
at the expense of consumers.  For example, in 1993, the OCC issued an 
interpretive letter finding that a Connecticut law prohibiting national banks 
from selling annuities in Connecticut was preempted by the National Bank 
Act; in 1996, the OCC issued an interpretive letter concluding that a Texas 
state law restricting national banks’ ability to sell annuities in the state was 
preempted by the National Bank Act; and in 2001, the OCC issued an 
interpretive letter finding that a Florida law prohibiting out-of-state banks 
from operating ATMs in the state was inconsistent with the National Bank 
Act and therefore preempted.  Each of these actions facilitated increased 
price competition and increased availability of financial services for local 
consumers, despite efforts by entrenched local political interests to avoid 
increased competition. 
Second, preemption increases the availability of credit while reducing 
its price.  Preemption limits the ability of states to impose price controls.  
Price controls ultimately decrease the level and quality of banking services 
to consumers, increase prices, and inhibit economic growth.  For example, 
in 2002, municipal ordinances in San Francisco and Santa Monica that 
prohibited banks from charging ATM fees to non-depositors were held to 
be preempted by the courts.  This action increased consumer choice and 
decreased the price for ATM services.  Preemption also removes obstacles 
to the creation of national credit markets. 
Third, preemption creates a uniform regulatory climate for banks 
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operating across state lines, allowing them to operate more efficiently.  A 
review of the economic literature on state regulation of banks reveals that 
reducing barriers to bank services across state lines increases economic 
efficiency and social welfare. 
A centralized regulatory regime is especially important in industries 
that are characterized by economies of scale, such as banking.  In Part III, 
we present two case studies illustrating the benefits of imposing uniform 
regulatory standards in other U.S. industries:  the wine industry and 
wireless telephony.  Several states erected barriers to out-of-state wineries 
directly shipping their goods ordered online or over the phone to consumers 
without similar restrictions for in-state wineries; these barriers were 
overturned by the Supreme Court in 2005, creating what economists call a 
“natural experiment” designed to test the consumer-welfare effects of the 
state regulations.  Economic research reveals that, soon after states’ 
discriminatory regulations were repealed, wine prices at brick-and-mortar 
stores declined up to 40% relative to prices offered by online retailers.  A 
similar episode occurred in the U.S. wireless industry.  Before 1994, states 
and the federal government had concurrent power to regulate wireless 
services; in 1994, the Federal Communications Commission preempted the 
state laws regulating wireless telephony.  Once again, economic research 
demonstrated that the change in regulatory oversight toward uniform, 
national standards increased economic efficiency.  Before deregulation, 
consumers in states that regulated wireless telephony, such as California 
and New York, paid more.  Furthermore, state regulations discouraged 
wireless providers from entering the market and slowed consumer adoption 
of cellular phones.  Just as balkanized state laws hindered the growth of 
wireless networks and raised cellular prices for everyone, balkanized state 
branching laws inhibited the growth of ATM networks and bank branches, 
raising the cost of credit and banking services for consumers. 
In Part IV, we offer two concrete policy implications that flow from 
our empirical findings.  First, elimination of preemption would jeopardize 
the significant economic benefits created by a uniform regulatory 
environment.  A careful review of the evidence indicates that preemption 
has been an important policy tool for opening up markets and increasing 
competition, benefiting both banks and their customers.  Without 
preemption, there would be no federal check on state regulators and 
legislatures who may be swayed by local business or political interests and 
costly local protectionist measures would proliferate.  Second, with 
preemption, policymakers can focus on creating new unified rules to better 
serve consumers and prevent the problems that led to the recent crisis from 
repeating themselves in the future.  Preemption was not responsible for the 
consumer-protection failures associated with predatory lending and the 
subprime crisis and preemption does not preclude the Federal government 
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from taking action to avoid repetition of the crisis.  The gaps in regulation 
identified in the recent crisis can be plugged with more stringent federal 
rules that preserve a uniform (and rigorous) regulatory environment. 
I. THE PREEMPTION DEBATE 
The dual banking system of the United States divides the regulation of 
banks between the states and the federal government.  Prior to the passage 
of the National Currency Act of 1863, private banks were exclusively state-
chartered.  But since the 1860s, banks have had the option of choosing 
whether to be state-chartered or nationally chartered.1  Congress created 
this system during the Civil War by the National Currency Act, which was 
subsequently modified and reenacted as the National Bank Act of 1864 
(“NBA”).2 
Under the NBA, the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency 
(“OCC”), a bureau within the Treasury Department, has the authority to 
charter and supervise all national banks.3  In addition, the NBA vests broad 
rulemaking authority in the OCC.4  An important issue throughout the 
history of the OCC has been the interplay between federal and state law 
with respect to the regulation and supervision of national banks. 
This section briefly reviews the treatment of preemption by the 
judiciary.  A review of the Supreme Court’s decisions in preemption cases 
reveals that the Court has, based on statute and legal precedent, both 
implicitly and explicitly promoted economic efficiency through 
preemption.  Through these rulings, the Court reduced state regulators’ 
ability to manipulate the banking industry, and thereby increased the 
economic efficiency of the nation overall. 
A. The roots of preemption of state laws in the banking industry 
 The Supreme Court and lower federal courts have determined that 
the National Bank Act and the associated regulations of the OCC preempt 
state laws.  Federally chartered savings associations are also considered 
federal instrumentalities, and the congressional enactment authorizing the 
establishment of these institutions also has preemptive effect. 
 
 1. Hal. S. Scott, What is the Proper Role of the States in Financial Regulation? in 
FEDERALISM AND FINANCIAL REGULATION IN FEDERAL PREEMPTION:  STATES’ POWERS, 
NATIONAL INTERESTS 139 (Richard A. Epstein & Michael S. Greve eds., 2007). 
 2. Id. 
 3. Id. 
 4. Id. 
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1. National banks 
The roots of the preemption doctrine may be found in the Supremacy 
Clause of the U.S. Constitution, which states that the Constitution and laws 
of the United States are the “Supreme Law” of the land, notwithstanding 
anything in the Constitution or laws of the States to the contrary.5  This 
clause was the basis for the landmark 1819 Supreme Court decision in 
McCulloch v. Maryland, establishing the principle that state law cannot 
stand as an obstacle to the accomplishment of federal legislative goals, in 
that case by a state’s attempt to tax the Bank of the United States.6 
Over the years since that decision, the Supreme Court and lower 
federal courts have frequently determined that the National Bank Act and 
the implementing regulations of the OCC preempt state laws.  For example, 
in 1874, just a few years after Congress adopted the National Bank Act, in 
Tiffany v. National Bank of Missouri, the Supreme Court stated, 
National banks have been national favorites.  They were 
established for the purpose, in part, of providing a currency for 
the whole country, and in part to create a market for the loans of 
the General government.  It could not have been intended, 
therefore, to expose them to the hazard of unfriendly legislation 
by the States, or to ruinous competition with State banks.7 
More recent cases have affirmed the preemptive effect of the National 
Bank Act and OCC regulations.  In Franklin National Bank v. New York, 
the Supreme Court held that a state could not prohibit a national bank from 
using the word “savings” in its advertising, since the state law conflicts 
with the power of national banks to accept savings deposits.8  In Marquette 
National Bank v. First of Omaha Corporation, the Supreme Court held that 
under the National Bank Act, a national bank may charge a rate of interest 
permitted in the bank’s home state, even if the loan is made through the use 
of a credit card to a customer residing in a different state with a lower usury 
limit.9  In Barnett Bank v. Nelson, the Supreme Court summarized the 
preemption doctrine, explaining that a state law cannot “stand as an 
obstacle to the accomplishment” of the purposes of a federal law, such as 
the National Bank Act.10  The Court also held that Congress would not 
want a state to “forbid, or to impair significantly, the exercise of a power 
that Congress has explicitly granted.”11  On the other hand, the Court stated 
 
 5. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2. 
 6. McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. 316 (1819). 
 7. Tiffany v. Nat’l Bank of Missouri, 85 U.S. 409, 413 (1874). 
 8. Franklin Nat’l Bank v. New York, 347 U.S. 373, 378-9 (1954). 
 9. Marquette Nat’l Bank v. First of Omaha Corp., 439 U.S. 299, 301 (1978). 
 10. Barnett Bank v. Nelson, 517 U.S. 25, 31 (1996). 
 11. Id. at 33. 
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that the states have the power to adopt laws that do not “significantly 
interfere” with national bank powers.12  More recent Supreme Court cases 
have continued to follow these precedents with respect to substantive state 
requirements.13  However, in 2009, the Court held that the National Bank 
Act does not preclude the ability of a state attorney general to bring an 
action in court to enforce applicable state or federal law against a national 
bank or its subsidiary.14 
2. Federal savings associations 
Federally chartered savings associations are also considered federal 
instrumentalities, and the congressional enactment authorizing the 
establishment of these institutions has preemptive effect.  In 1982, in the 
case of Fidelity Federal Savings and Loan Association v. De la Cuesta, the 
Supreme Court held that both the statute and the implementing regulations 
of the Federal Home Loan Bank Board (the predecessor agency to the 
Office of Thrift Supervision) preempt conflicting state laws.15  Specifically, 
the Court held that Board's due-on-sale regulation preempted conflicting 
state limitations on the due-on-sale practices of federal savings and loan 
associations.16 
A due-on-sale clause is a common provision in a mortgage contract 
that gives the lender the right to declare the entire mortgage loan due and 
payable upon the sale of the home.  In the early 1980s, when interest rates 
soared to extremely high levels, it became difficult to sell a home without a 
sharp discount in the sales price, merely because of the cost of financing 
the home with a new loan.17  California courts at that time ruled that the 
economic situation made due-on-sale clauses unreasonable under 
California law, and therefore void, provided the creditworthiness of the 
new owner was acceptable to the lender.18  However, while these actions 
helped the current homeowner sell his or her home for a higher price, it 
also added significant losses for the savings association lender, since the 
 
 12. Id. 
 13. See, e.g., Watters v. Wachovia, 550 U.S. 1, 7 (2007) (holding that national banks 
and their operating subsidiaries are not required to register under state mortgage licensing 
law). 
 14. Cuomo v. Clearing House Ass’n, 129 S. Ct. 2710, 2722 (2009). 
 15. Fidelity Fed. Savings and Loan Ass’n v. De la Cuesta, 458 U.S. 141, 170 (1982). 
 16. Id. 
 17. See, e.g., Federal Housing Finance Association, Housing Prices Continue to Grow 
at Healthy Rates, Figure 1:  Real Gross Domestic Product and the OFHEO HPI Since 1975, 
available at http://www.fhfa.gov/webfiles/1066/Focus1Q02.pdf (showing that the real house 
price index declined in the early 1980s)). 
 18. See, e.g., Wellenkamp v. Bank of America, 582 P.2d 970, (Cal. 1978) (holding that 
state chartered banks and savings and loan associations and other mortgage lenders were 
forbidden from making mortgages due on sale). 
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savings association had to pay market rates to fund the loan but was 
receiving a below market rate as long as the mortgage was outstanding. 
The Federal Home Loan Bank Board recognized the safety and 
soundness implications of the California decision and issued a regulation 
preempting state laws (including judicial interpretations) that prevented 
federal savings associations from exercising due-on-sale provisions in 
existing mortgage contracts.  In De la Cuesta, the Supreme Court affirmed 
the preemptive effect of this regulation. 
From a policy perspective, this case illustrates the potential risks 
associated with imbalances between federal and state law.  The lack of 
federal law created what economists call a “moral hazard” problem—
namely, the federal government having to pay for the costs created by 
California’s attempt at regulation; by creating a significant safety and 
soundness risk to California savings associations, the state endangered the 
federal insurance fund backing the deposits at these institutions.  The 
imposition of a uniform standard solved the moral hazard problem.  
Furthermore, the story of De La Cuesta illustrates that preserving the safety 
and soundness of banks, on the one hand, and protecting consumers on the 
other are inseparable policy goals.  Allowing banks to maximize their 
opportunities to operate efficiently is necessary for insuring that consumers 
have access to affordable credit. 
B. The case for and against preemption 
When preemption is considered from an efficiency standpoint, its 
merits become apparent.  In a 2008 article in the University of 
Pennsylvania Law Review, Harvard Law Professor Elizabeth Warren, chair 
of the Congressional Oversight Panel which argued in favor of ending 
preemption, and her co-author Oren Bar-Gill, professor of New York 
University School of Law, wrote: 
The erosion of state power in itself need not be problematic from 
a consumer protection perspective.  In an era of interstate 
banking, uniform regulation of consumer credit products at the 
federal level may well be more efficient than a litany of 
consumer protection rules that vary from state to state.  The 
problem is not in the federal preemption; it is in the failure of 
federal law to offer a suitable alternative to the preempted state 
law.19 
As we discuss in-depth below, the charge that federal law has failed to 
protect consumers is false.  The overwhelming majority of instances of 
 
 19. Oren Bar-Gill & Elizabeth Warren, Making Credit Safer, 157 U PA. L. REV. 1, 83 
(2008) (emphasis added). 
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predatory lending involved loans originated by institutions not subject to 
preemption, but instead under the purview of state laws.  However, it is 
extremely salient that even an advocate of increased consumer protection 
like Professor Warren concluded that preemption, in and of itself, is likely 
justified in terms of the efficiencies it creates.  A deeper examination of the 
economics of preemption reveals that Professor Warren had it right in her 
law review article:  preemption has been a force for increasing the 
efficiency of the banking sector. 
Those conclusions are well established.  Professor Phillip Strahan of 
Boston College gave a presentation at the Chicago Fed’s 42nd Annual 
Conference on Bank Structure and Competition in which he concluded that 
“preemption of state laws continues the process of financial opening by 
lowering [the] cost of interstate banking.”20  He also found that financial 
openness benefits both banks and the economy as a whole.21  He averred 
that the financial openness had helped banks to achieve economies of scale 
and improve risk management, and had increased competition in the 
banking sector.22  He documents a variety of benefits to consumers 
associated with preemption, including higher quality service from ATMs 
and bank branches, increased convenience, lower prices for loans, and 
lower underwriting fees.23 
Similarly, Dr. Gary Whalen, an economist at the OCC, examined the 
consequences of preemption on national bank and state banks by 
examining the OCC’s preemption of state anti-predatory lending statues, 
beginning with the preemption of the Georgia Fair Lending Act 
(“GLFA”).24  In 2003, a national bank asked the OCC to examine the 
GLFA; the OCC found that the law would “otherwise affect national 
banks’ real estate lending” and, accordingly, concluded that federal law 
preempted GLFA.25  In 2004, the OCC promulgated a new set of rules 
generally preempting state laws that regulate the credit terms offered by 
banks.26  To a large extent, these rules codified prior court decisions, letters, 
and regulations, including those issued by the OTS, putting them all in one 
 
 20. Philip E. Strahan, Financial Openness and Regulatory Competition, Presentation at 
the Chicago Fed Bank Structure Conference (May 2006), available at 
http://www.chicagofed.org/news_and_conferences/conferences_and_events/files/2006_bsc_
strahan.pdf. 
 21. Id. 
 22. Id. at 6. 
 23. Id. at 7. 
 24. Gary Whalen, The Wealth Effects of Preemption Announcements by the Office of 
the Comptroller of the Currency After the Passage of the Georgia Fair Lending Act, OFFICE 
OF THE COMPTROLLER OF THE CURRENCY (2005), available at 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=869038. 
 25. Id. at 1. 
 26. Id. 
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place. 
To gauge the effect of preemption on national and state banks, Dr. 
Whalen employed an event study to examine how the stocks of holding 
companies associated with national banks and with state banks responded 
to the various public announcements surrounding these preemption 
decisions.27  Dr. Whalen’s event study focused on four events occurring 
from 2003 to 2004 where the OCC made a significant announcement 
concerning its intent to preempt state anti-predatory laws.28 
Dr. Whalen reaches two salient conclusions.  First, he finds that 
“[t]aken as a whole, the findings suggest that state anti-predatory lending 
laws like the GFLA impose a proportionately greater compliance burden on 
smaller, multistate companies unable to realize economies of scale, which 
is reduced by preemption.”29  Second, he finds no evidence that preemption 
places state banks at a competitive disadvantage.30  Indeed, the results 
indicate that smaller holding companies associated with state chartered 
banks tended to show positive rather than negative excess returns around 
the announcement events; they did not “differ significantly from national 
bank companies with similar characteristics.”31  Thus, Dr. Whalen’s 
empirical analysis suggests that the opponents of preemption have ignored 
the compliance costs that ending preemption will impose on smaller, 
national banks, while exaggerating its potential to harm state banks. 
Julie Williams, First Senior Deputy Comptroller and Chief Counsel at 
the OCC, and Michael Bylsma, Director of the Community and Consumer 
Law Division at the OCC, described the OCC’s approach to anti-predatory 
lending regulation in an article in the American Bar Association’s Business 
Lawyer.32  The authors explain that in 2003, “the OCC issued the most 
comprehensive supervisory standards to address predatory and abusive 
lending practices ever published by a federal banking agency.”33  Rather 
than attempting to ban specific loan or credit arrangements, the OCC’s 
regulations forced banks to examine their own lending policies based on 
the potential they create for abusive, illegal, or unsound lending practices.34  
The OCC regulations covered a wide variety of subjects, including 
underwriting policies, abusive lending practices, high-risk transactions, 
loan flipping, and equity stripping.35  The OCC enforces its regulations 
 
 27. Id. at 2. 
 28.  Id. at 21. 
 29.  Id. at 33. 
 30.  Id. 
 31. Id. at 33-34. 
 32. Julie L. Williams & Michael S. Bylsma, Federal Preemption and Federal Banking 
Agency Responses to Predatory Lending, 59 BUS. LAW. 1193 (2004). 
 33. Id. at 1194. 
 34. Id. at 1195. 
 35. Id. at 1193-96. 
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with a staff of approximately 1,700 examiners who evaluate national banks 
and their subsidiaries.36  The authors explain that “[i]n addition to on-site 
examinations of loan file reviews, OCC examiners look at bank policies 
and procedures as part of the supervisory process.”37  The evidence 
indicates that the OCC’s anti-predatory lending measures have been 
effective.  The authors aver “information available to the OCC from its 
consumer complaint database and supervisory activities does not suggest a 
general problem involving direct lending by national banks or their 
operating subsidiaries.”38  Indeed, a group of State Attorneys General 
recognized in an Amicus Brief submitted in National Home Equity 
Mortgage Association v. OTS that banks and their subsidiaries subject to 
OCC supervision were not responsible for predatory lending abuses: 
Based on consumer complaints received, as well as investigations 
and enforcement actions undertaken by the Attorneys General, 
predatory lending abuses are largely confined to the subprime 
mortgage lending market and to non-depository institutions.  
Almost all of the leading subprime lenders are mortgage 
companies and finance companies, not banks or direct bank 
subsidiaries.39 
Notwithstanding such findings, critics of preemption continue to push 
three main arguments, including blaming federal regulation for the 
subprime crisis, alleging that federal regulation has been lax, and that 
preemption threatens the banking market’s stability. 
First, consumer groups like the Consumer Federation of America and 
Public Interest Research Groups have claimed that preemption is 
responsible for the increase in lax and predatory lending associated with the 
subprime crisis.40  In particular, they argue that preemption of state banking 
laws allowed banks to originate predatory subprime and option-adjustable-
rate mortgages (“ARMs”).  According to the OCC, national banks and their 
operating subsidiaries originated only about 10% of the subprime loans 
made in 2006, and only 12% to 14% of the non-prime loans originated in 
the 2005-2007 period.41  The foreclosure rates for loans originated by 
 
 36. Id. at 1200. 
 37. Id. 
 38. Id. at 1199. 
 39. Id. at n.29 (citing Brief for State Attorneys General as Amicus Curiae at 26, Nat'l 
Home Equity Mortgage Ass'n v. OTS, 271 F. Supp. 2d 264 (D.D.C. 2003)). 
 40. Edmund Mierzwinski, Preemption of State Consumer Laws:  Federal Interference 
is a Market Failure, as reprinted in 6 GOV’T L. & POL’Y J. 6, 6-12 (2004); Allen Fishbein, 
Press Release, Consumer Federation of America, Consumer Groups Join to Persuade 
Congress to Protect State Banking Regulations (Mar. 17, 2004), available at 
http://www.consumerfed.org/pdfs/CFApreemption.pdf. 
 41. Letter from John Dugan, Comptroller of the Currency, to Elizabeth Warren, Chair, 
Congressional Oversight Panel (Feb. 14, 2009), available at 
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national banks were substantially lower than those issued by state regulated 
entities, indicating that these were higher quality and better underwritten 
mortgages.42  Because the Community Reinvestment Act (CRA) applies 
only to banks, one can also examine the proportion of subprime loans made 
by non-CRA lenders to test the robustness of our findings.  A recent white 
paper issued by the Treasury noted that 94% of “high-priced loans” to 
“lower income borrowers” were originated by lenders not covered by the 
CRA.43 Even proponents of increased financial regulation, such as the 
Chairman of the House Committee on Financial Services, Barney Frank, 
have acknowledged that the loans that prompted the subprime crisis were 
“primarily being made outside the regular banking system.”44  Hence, it is 
hard to find a credible link between federal preemption and the credit crisis. 
Second, some opponents of preemption have asserted that preemption 
is responsible for lax federal regulation of banking.45 Yet this argument is 
also flawed because there is no necessary connection between preemption 
and the level of regulatory oversight.  Preemption is about uniform 
regulation only.  There is no reason why preemption and increased 
oversight (relative to the current standards) cannot go hand in hand.  
Indeed, the OCC is held in the industry to be one of the most stringent bank 
regulatory agencies. 
Third, some critics have attempted to argue that preemption threatens 
the stability of the dual banking system.46  This argument is both 
economically flawed and empirically inaccurate.  From an economic 
perspective, this argument essentially boils down to an assertion that we 
should make national banks less efficient to prop up the dual-banking 
system.  However, rendering national banks less efficient would weaken 
 
http://www.occ.treas.gov/ftp/occ_copre sponse_021209.pdf. 
 42. Id. 
 43. DEPARTMENT OF THE TREASURY, FINANCIAL REGULATORY REFORM, A NEW 
FOUNDATION:  REBUILDING FINANCIAL SUPERVISION AND REGULATION,  at 69-70 (June 17, 
2009) (“Moreover, the Federal Reserve has reported that only six percent of all the higher-
priced loans were extended by the CRA-covered lenders to lower income borrowers or 
neighborhoods in the local areas that are the focus of CRA evaluations.”). 
 44. Barney Frank, Chairman, H.R. Comm. on Fin. Serv., Speech before the National 
Press Club:  The “Loan Arrangers” Will Not Ride Again (Jul. 27, 2009), available at 
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/rep-barney-frank/the-loan-arrangers-will-n_b_247264.html. 
 45. CONGRESSIONAL OVERSIGHT PANEL ON REGULATORY REFORM, SPECIAL REPORT ON 
REGULATORY REFORM, MODERNIZING THE AMERICAN FINANCIAL REGULATORY SYSTEM: 
RECOMMENDATIONS FOR IMPROVING OVERSIGHT, PROTECTING CONSUMERS, AND ENSURING 
STABILITY, at 30-33 (Jan. 2009), available at http://cop.senate.gov/documents/cop-012909-
report-regulatoryreform.pdf. 
 46. See, e.g., Arthur E. Wilmarth, Jr., The OCC's Preemption Rules Exceed the 
Agency's Authority and Present a Serious Threat to the Dual Banking System and Consumer 
Protection, 23 ANN. REV. BANKING & FIN. L. 225, 229 (2004) (arguing that “the OCC’s new 
rules, unless overturned by Congress or the courts, will do great harm to the state banking 
system, thereby threatening the viability of the dual banking system.”). 
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the banking system as a whole.  Furthermore, as Dr. Whalen’s research 
made clear, there is no empirical basis for the claim that state banks are 
harmed by preemption. 
II. ECONOMIC BENEFITS OF PREEMPTION 
Under the proposed financial services act, federal laws governing the 
banking sector would as a regulatory “floor,” and states would be invited to 
adopt stricter standards for anything that can be labeled “consumer 
protection.”  It is highly unlikely, however, that all states would respond in 
the same way.  Disparate standards would cause banks’ costs to rise and 
dampen innovation in the banking industry.  Moreover, because the 
banking industry is competitive, increased costs would be largely passed 
onto banks’ customers.  In this section, we identify the economic benefits 
of uniform bank regulations using examples from actual OCC interventions 
and academic studies.  We find that preemption generates three primary 
benefits for banking customers:  (1) it prevents states from imposing 
protectionist measures, (2) it increases the availability and reduces the price 
of credit, and (3) it creates a uniform regulatory climate for multi-state 
banks, allowing them to operate more efficiently. 
 A. Preemption of protectionist measures 
 It is widely recognized as a matter of economics that the protection 
of competitors rather than competition decreases economic welfare.  In a 
widely-used microeconomics textbook, Professor William Baumol of NYU 
and Alan Blinder of Princeton quote the Seventh Circuit's ruling in 
Stamatakis Industries v. King, which emphasizes this distinction: 
“[c]ompetition is ruthless, unprincipled, uncharitable, unforgiving—and a 
boon to society, Adam Smith reminds us, precisely because of these 
qualities that make it a bane to other producers.”47  Unfortunately, 
disadvantaged competitors often seek and obtain protection from 
competition under the guise of protecting consumers to the detriment of 
consumers and society as a whole. 
 Economic textbooks are replete with examples of how protectionism 
at the international level reduces consumer welfare.  Protectionism within a 
country is similarly harmful.  UCLA economists Harold Cole and Lee 
Ohanian examined the economic consequences of protecting certain 
industries and groups of workers during the New Deal.  The authors point 
out that while falling productivity, a diminishing monetary base, and a 
 
 47. WILLIAM J. BAUMOL & ALAN S. BLINDER, MICROECONOMICS:  PRINCIPLES AND 
POLICY 456 (The Dryden Press 7th ed. 1997) (citing Stamatakis Industries v. King, 965 F. 
2d 469, 471 (1992)). 
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chaotic banking system wreaked havoc on the economy between 1929 and 
1933, these “negative shocks . . . [became] positive after 1933.”48  Hence, 
the puzzle remains why, even after the turnaround, those factors failed to 
precipitate a recovery.  The authors conclude that about half of the 
weakness of the recovery can be explained by New Deal policies that 
allowed industries to collude or create monopolies—thus increasing the 
prices of their products—in exchange for paying higher wages.  The 
policies protected inefficient incumbent firms and workers who kept their 
jobs, but at high costs to would-be competitors, the ranks of the 
unemployed, and consumers. 
 Given that protectionism has strong negative economic 
consequences, it is essential to consider the National Bank Act and the 
OCC’s role as the agency charged with implementing that Act in 
facilitating competition among banks.  The OCC has played an important 
role in intervening to ensure that states do not protect local interests, like 
insurance companies, from competition at the expense of consumers.  For 
example, in 1993, the OCC issued an interpretive letter that found that the 
National Bank Act preempts a Connecticut law that prohibited national 
banks from selling annuities in Connecticut.49 The OCC also reached a 
similar conclusion with respect to a Connecticut requirement mandating 
that national banks dealing in annuities obtain a license from the state.50 In 
1996, the OCC issued an interpretive letter that also found that the National 
Bank Act preempted a Texas state law that restricted national banks’ ability 
to sell annuities in the state.  Indeed, the OCC found that the law at issue 
“effectively prohibit[ed] national banks from selling annuities as agents in 
Texas.”51 In essence, these state initiatives, which one can reasonably infer 
were adopted at the behest of local political interests to protect against 
vigorous competition, created inefficiencies in the marketplace, denying 
consumers the added choice and lower costs associated with more open 
markets. 
In 1997, the OCC issued an interpretive letter that concluded that the 
National Bank Act preempted a Wisconsin law that precluded out-of-state 
national banks from acting as a fiduciary in the state.52 The decision was 
prompted by a merger between two trust bank subsidiaries of Bank One, 
 
 48. Harold L. Cole & Lee E. Ohanian, New Deal Policies and the Persistence of the 
Great Depression:  A General Equilibrium Analysis, 112 J. POL. ECON. 779, 781 (2004). 
 49. OFFICE OF THE COMPTROLLER OF THE CURRENCY, INTERPRETIVE LETTER #623 at 4, 
(May 10, 1993). 
 50. Id. 
 51. OFFICE OF THE COMPTROLLER OF THE CURRENCY, INTERPRETIVE LETTER #748 at 1, 
(Sept. 13, 1996). 
 52. OFFICE OF THE COMPTROLLER OF THE CURRENCY, CORPORATE DECISION #97-33 at 
13, (Jun. 1, 1997). 
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operating separately in Wisconsin and Ohio.53  Under Wisconsin’s state law 
regarding trusts, Bank One would no longer have been able to act as a 
fiduciary in Wisconsin after the merger.54  In 1998, the OCC issued an 
interpretive letter that found that a Missouri law that precluded out-of-state 
national banks from acting as a fiduciary in the state was inconsistent with 
the National Bank Act, and therefore preempted.55  The decision was 
prompted by a merger in which North Carolina-based NationsBank 
subsumed its Missouri-based affiliate, Boatmen’s Trust Company.56 
In 2001, the OCC issued an interpretive letter that found a conflict 
between Federal law and a Massachusetts law that mandated that “an out-
of-state bank may establish an ATM only if the laws of the state in which it 
has its main office would permit a bank with its main office in 
Massachusetts to establish an ATM in that state.”57  In the same year, the 
OCC also issued an interpretive letter that determined that a Florida law 
that prohibited out-of-state banks from operating ATMs in the state 
impermissibly interfered with the powers granted a national bank under the 
National Bank Act.58  The decision was prompted by a request from a bank 
without branches in either state that was considering placing deposit-taking 
ATMs in those states.59 In the absence of these interventions, ATM 
placements would likely have been much smaller in Massachusetts and 
Florida. 
In sum, the benefits to consumers created via these OCC letters—
which manifest themselves in the former of increased competition, lower 
prices, and greater access to ATMs—must be considered carefully when 
measuring the net benefits of ending preemption. 
B. Preemption reduces the price of credit while increasing its availability 
 Preemption has increased the availability of credit (and reduced its 
price) by eliminating price controls and by promoting uniform national 
markets. 
 1. Price controls 
 In addition to eliminating protectionist statutes, preemption has 
 
 53. Id. at 1-2. 
 54. Id. at 13. 
 55. OFFICE OF THE COMPTROLLER OF THE CURRENCY, CORPORATE DECISION #98-16 at 6, 
(Mar. 4, 1998). 
 56. Id. at 1. 
 57. OFFICE OF THE COMPTROLLER OF THE CURRENCY, INTERPRETIVE LETTER #939 at 1, 
(Oct. 15, 2001). 
 58. Id. at 2. 
 59. Id. at 1. 
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prevented states from effectively imposing price controls on banking 
products.  There is broad agreement among economists that price controls 
have harmful economic consequences.60  As the late Nobel Laureate Milton 
Friedman observed, both the shortage of housing in New York and the 
gasoline shortages of the 1970s were caused by well-meaning legislation 
that imposed price controls.61  Although these provisions often seem 
beneficial to consumers in that they guarantee lower prices, economics 
shows that price controls cause suppliers to reduce their output.  The loss of 
economic value to consumers that this reduction in output creates exceeds 
any benefits that result from the lower prices, and thus, consumers are 
worse off.  Economists refer to these losses of output as “deadweight loss” 
because of the economic value that is destroyed as a result of the dead 
weight of the regulation.  Accordingly, it is reasonable to assume that the 
OCC’s preemption decisions striking down state-enforced price controls 
have increased economic welfare. 
An analysis of discussions surrounding city-level restrictions on ATM 
fees is edifying on this point.  In 2002, the U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals 
for the Ninth Circuit upheld a district court ruling preempting municipal 
ordinances in San Francisco and Santa Monica that prohibited banks from 
charging ATM fees to non-depositors.62  The ordinances, which were 
enacted in October and November of 1999 by Santa Monica and San 
Francisco, respectively, were challenged by a group of banks and the 
California Bankers Association.63  The banks ceased allowing non-
depositors to use their ATMs while the law was in place,64 presumably 
because restrictions on surcharges eliminated the economic incentive to 
providing such services to non-customers.  In essence, consumers were 
denied access to valuable financial services because of lobbying by 
parochial local concerns.  Such “deadweight loss” destroyed the economic 
value of providing ATM service to non-customers, resulting in an overall 
loss of consumer benefits.  While the Court of Appeals ruled the National 
Bank Act and the regulations of OCC permit national banks to charge 
 
 60.  DENNIS W. CARLTON & JERRY M. PERLOFF, MODERN INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION 
715 (Addison Wesley 4th ed. 2004) (“Regulation can reduce the efficiency of competitive 
markets. In many cities around the world, government agencies regulate apartment rental 
rates, using rent controls to keep rental rates below the competitive level.  As a result, the 
demand for housing exceeds the supply.”); MICHAEL L. KATZ & HARVEY S. ROSEN, 
MICROECONOMICS 365-66 (McGraw-Hill 3d ed. 1998) (demonstrating that total economic 
welfare (surplus) falls as a result of price controls). 
 61.  MILTON FRIEDMAN & ROSE FRIEDMAN, FREE TO CHOOSE:  A PERSONAL STATEMENT 
219 (Houghton Mifflin Harcourt 1990). 
 62.  Bank of America, et al. v. City and County of San Francisco, 309 F. 3d 551, 555-6 
(9th Cir. 2002). 
 63. Id. at 556. 
 64. Id. at 557. 
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ATM fees,65 it is instructive to note the significant impact a local 
municipality’s action could have had on the provision of financial services 
in a given area.  The exponential negative impact that differing actions by 
50 state legislatures, as permitted under the Administration’s proposals, 
could have on our national marketplace is thus particularly worrisome. 
Academic analysis of state ATM fee restrictions further supports the 
case against local price regulation.  Professor Gautaum Gowrisankaran and 
John Krainer of the San Francisco Federal Reserve provide empirical 
evidence that permitting surcharging increases access to ATMs.66  The 
authors compared the behavior of ATM operators in Minnesota, where 
surcharging has been allowed since 1996, to ATM operators in Iowa, which 
upheld a surcharge ban until 2003.67  The authors find that the Iowa 
surcharge ban reduced ATM entry by an average of approximately 12% in 
the counties along the Minnesota border.68 
Economic logic also suggests that the negative consequences of 
restrictions on surcharging will fall primarily on smaller, interstate banks.  
Surcharging affects mainly bank customers using out-of-network ATMs.  
Faced with ATM surcharge restrictions, banks would most likely continue 
to operate (smaller) ATM networks, but they would allow only customers 
with accounts at the bank to use their ATMs.  Consumers desiring quick, 
reliable access to cash would then be forced to switch to larger banks to 
insure uninterrupted access to ATM machines.  Accordingly, state-level 
regulation of ATM fees may paradoxically burden smaller banks - the very 
banks that critics of preemption argue are essential to insure the health of 
the banking system. 
Basic economics demonstrates that price controls have the perverse 
consequences of reducing output and actually increasing the final prices 
paid by consumers.  By lowering the price firms can charge for the 
products they supply, price controls induce firms to reduce supply.  As a 
result of the shortage, consumers are either forced to pay exorbitant rates in 
black markets or bid up the prices of substitutes.69 As the prominent 
economist Dr. Robert Litan of the Brookings Institution explained in an 
article on anti-predatory lending laws, although price controls are often 
 
 65. Id. at 558. 
 66. Gautuam Gowrisankaran & John Krainer, Bank ATMs and ATM Surcharges, 
FRBSF ECON. LETTER 2005-36, Dec. 16, 2005, available at 
http://www.frbsf.org/publications/economics/letter/2005/el2005-36.html.  Until 1996, the 
major ATM networks prohibited levying surcharges.  From 1996 to 2001, five years after 
the ban on surcharging was lifted, ATM deployment roughly tripled.  The authors note that 
“the regime change provided a kind of ‘before and after’ experiment commonly used to 
examine the predictions of economic models.” Id. at 2. 
 67. Id. 
 68. Id. 
 69. MILTON FRIEDMAN, PRICE THEORY 18 (Transaction Publishers 2007). 
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instituted to protect consumers, as a rule, they end up harming the 
consumers they were intended to protect.70 
2. National markets 
The promotion of uniform, national markets has also increased the 
availability of credit at reduced cost to millions of American consumers.  
For example, preemption has helped ensure the efficient functioning of the 
national market for securitized mortgages.  Securitization is vital to 
enhancing liquidity in the area of home loans, car loans, credit cards, and 
commercial loans.  As Leon Kendall and Michael Fishman explained in 
their seminal book on securitization, securitization is “one of the most 
important and abiding innovations to emerge in financial markets since the 
1930s.”71 
Kendall and Fishman list seven basic requirements of any successful 
securitization:  “(1) standardized contract[]; (2) grading of risk via 
underwriting; (3) database of historic statistics; (4) standardization of 
applicable laws; (5) standardization of servicer quality; (6) reliable supply 
of quality credit enhancers; and (7) computers [to] handle complexity of 
analysis.”72 Uniform regulations not only directly implicate their fourth 
requirement, but they also permit securitizers to compile and analyze 
historical data by region holding the regulations constant, which is also a 
necessary condition for a successful securitization.  Without uniform 
lending rules, it is impossible for securitizers to measure the risk of a pool 
of loans, which in turn, complicates the pricing of loans for the secondary 
market.  Without uniform standards, including standard laws, the sales 
price would be prohibitive and the market would break down. 
Moreover, disparate state laws in areas concerning what defines a 
“finance charge” or what constitutes an “acceptable” interest rate further 
undermine the ability to securitize the cash flows from mortgage loans.  
The principal payment and the finance charge are two primary cash flows 
in any securitization.  If different jurisdictions define the finance charge 
differently, needless complexity would be added to the process of 
securitization.  If some jurisdictions effectively prohibited securitization 
through assignee liability or limitations or restrictions on the ability to sell 
finance charge receivables, those jurisdictions would hamper local 
 
 70. Robert E. Litan, Unintended Consequences:  The Risk of Premature State 
Regulation of Predatory Lending, AMERICAN BANKERS ASSOCIATION (2003), available at 
http://www.aba.com/NR/rdonlyres/1FAE5B14-C034-4FF7-8566-9664F0BDEDEC/28934/ 
PredReport20093.pdf. 
 71.  LEON KENDALL & MICHAEL FISHMAN, A PRIMER ON SECURITIZATION 1 (MIT Press 
1996). 
 72. Id. at 7 (Table 1) (emphasis added). 
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economic performance at the expense of the Federal safety net for lending 
institutions, just like the attempts by California to nullify the due-on-sale 
clause referred to in earlier sections. 
In the event of such disparate regulation, it would be nearly 
impossible to convert cash flows from disparately-regulated loans into 
standardized streams that could be securitized, resulting in significant 
negative implications for the U.S. economy.  According to Securities 
Industry and Financial Markets Information, as of the second quarter 2009, 
there were $307.5 billion in outstanding asset-backed securities (ABS) for 
credit cards; $354.7 billion in outstanding ABS for home equity loans; and 
$132.0 billion in outstanding ABS for automobile loans.73  Fannie Mae has 
been able to obtain a large base of low-cost funding by aggregating 
uniform loans that were originated throughout the United States.  But 
Fannie Mae cannot achieve the requisite scale without uniform national 
rules.74 
To be sure, there are structural problems in the mortgage market that 
must be resolved.  But because securitization plays such an important role 
in increasing liquidity and lowering costs, it is essential that we perfect the 
securitization process rather than restrict the efficient functioning of the 
national mortgage market.  Indeed, it has been noted in the media that with 
the recent “credit crunch” consumers have been forced to take out loans at 
extremely high rates of interest from loan sharks.75  As Dr. Litan observed, 
state regulations that interfere with the functioning of credit markets often 
interfere with the “democratization” of credit.76  In other words, interfering 
with credit markets by inhibiting the development of national markets for 
financial products like mortgages increases the prices and decreases the 
availability of credit. 
 
 73. SIFMA, Asset-Backed Securities Outstanding, available at 
http://www.sifma.org/uploadedFiles/Research/Statistics/SIFMA_USABSOutstanding.pdf. 
 74. In response to amended version of The Georgia Fair Lending Act introduced on 
March 7, 2003, Fannie Mae issued a statement explaining that it would not purchase any 
loans classified as “high-cost home loans” under the Act.  Fannie Mae, Announcement 03-
02, Purchase of Georgia and New York “High-Cost Home Loans” (Mar. 31, 2003) Freddie 
Mac also announced that it would not purchase high-cost loans in Georgia.  See Industry 
Letter from Freddie Mac to All Freddie Mac Sellers and Servicers, Re:  Revisions to Freddie 
Mac's Mortgage Purchase Requirements Based on the Enactment of Section 6-L of the New 
York State Banking Law and Amendments to the Georgia Fair Lending Act (Mar. 31, 
2003), available at 
www.mortgagebankers.org/files/Residential/2003/freddie_indyltr0331.pdf (discussing the 
revisions of mortgage requirements in New York and Georgia due to the passing of 
enactments 6-L of the New York State Banking Law and amendment to the Georgia Fair 
Lending Act). 
 75.  Alistair MacDonald & Jeanne Whalen, Loan Sharks Circle Credit-Starved 
Consumers, WALL ST. J., Sept. 1, 2009, available at 
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB125175126871273709.html. 
 76. Litan, supra note 70, at 18. 
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C. Preemption creates a uniform regulatory climate for multi-state 
banks, allowing them to operate more efficiently 
 By allowing banks to operate under a uniform regulatory structure, 
preemption increases the ability of national banks to operate efficiently 
throughout the United States.  However, one can only speculate, what 
impact 50 different state laws on ATM fees, for example, would have on 
the cost of banking services to everyday consumers, let alone the effect on 
the national marketplace. 
To prove empirical evidence of the negative impact that state actions 
can have on economic efficiencies and consumer benefits, we looked back 
to the lifting of state branching restrictions that occurred in the 1990s and 
the economic ramifications of such actions.  A review of the economic 
literature on state regulation of banks reveals that reducing barriers to bank 
expansion across state lines increases the banking services available to 
consumers while lowering the price.  To the extent that ending preemption 
will impose higher regulatory costs on national banks operating in several 
states, the economic literature suggests that both banks and consumers will 
suffer. 
Jith Jayaratane and Philip Strahan, former senior economists at the 
Federal Reserve Bank of New York, analyzed the “impact of geographic 
restrictions on the banking industry” by looking at states’ removal of 
geographic limits on bank branching from 1978 to 1992.77  The authors 
found that “bank efficiency improved greatly once branching restrictions 
were lifted” and that “[l]oan losses and operating costs fell sharply and the 
reduction in banks’ costs was largely passed along to bank borrowers in the 
form of lower loan rates.”78  The authors found that benefits were not only 
limited to bank customers; state economies also grew faster once branching 
was allowed.79 
 Astrid Dick, former economist in the Research Group of the Federal 
Reserve Bank of New York, examined the effects of the Riegle-Neal Act’s 
deregulation of branching restrictions on market structure, service, and 
performance.80 The author finds that “[a] significant portion of the observed 
 
 77. Jith Jayaratne & Philip E. Strahan, The Benefits of Branching Deregulation, 3 
FRBNY ECON. POL’Y REV. 13 (Dec. 1997), available at 
http://www.ny.frb.org/research/epr/97v03n4/9712jaya.pdf. 
 78. Id. 
 79.  Id. at 14 (“While the improvements to the banking system following deregulation 
helped bank customers directly, we also find important benefits to the rest of the economy.  
In particular, state economies grew significantly faster once branching was allowed—in 
part, we suggest, because deregulation permitted the expansion of those banks that were best 
able to route savings to the most productive uses.”). 
 80.  Astrid A. Dick, Nationwide Branching and Its Impact on Market Structure, 
Quality, and Bank Performance, 79 J. BUS. 567, 567 (2006). 
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increase in branch networks can be traced to the deregulation, allowing 
consumers to enjoy larger fee-free networks locally and regionally.”81 The 
author also finds that banking spreads fall in the context of deregulation 
while bank profit rates remain constant.82  These findings, in conjunction 
with the research of Jayaratne and Strahan, bolster our thesis that 
preemption increases the ability of national banks to operate more 
efficiently, which redounds to the ultimate benefit of consumers and local 
economies. 
III.  CASE STUDIES OF THE BENEFITS OF IMPOSING UNIFORM REGULATORY 
STANDARDS IN OTHER U.S. INDUSTRIES 
In evaluating the potential consequences of ending preemption for 
national banks, it is useful to consider real-world examples from other U.S. 
industries that have experienced a change in the uniformity of their 
regulatory oversight.  We offer case studies from the wine and telecom 
industries, which demonstrate that eliminating state regulations that impair 
competition leads to greater economic efficiency. 
A. The wine industry 
Eight states, including Michigan and New York erected barriers to 
out-of-state wineries directly shipping their goods ordered online or over 
the phone to consumers without similar restrictions for in-state wineries.  In 
2005, the Supreme Court ruled that state alcohol laws may not discriminate 
between in-state and out-of-state producers because the 21st Amendment 
does not override the Commerce Clause.83 
In 2003, lower court rulings forced Virginia to repeal a discriminatory 
law similar to New York’s.84 This change allowed economists Professor 
Alan Wiseman of Ohio State University and Professor Jerry Ellig of 
George Mason University to evaluate the effects of removing interstate 
trade barriers.  The authors measured the price of the most popular wines 
both in traditional brick-and-mortar stores and on Internet retailers’ 
websites before and after the court’s decision.  In both periods, online 
stores were cheaper and had a wider selection, though, before the decision, 
 
 81. Id. 
 82. Id. at 587-591. 
 83.  Charles Lane, Justices Reject Curbs on Wine Sales; 5-4 Ruling a Victory for 
Interstate Shippers, WASHINGTON POST, May 17, 2005, at A1 (reporting on Granholm v. 
Heald, 544 U.S. 460 (2005)). 
 84. Alan E. Wiseman & Jerry Ellig, Legislative Action, Market Reaction and Interstate 
Commerce:  Results of Virginia's Natural Experiment with Direct Wine Shipment, Mercatus 
Center (Dec. 15, 2005), at 2-3, available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=836364. 
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Virginians could not take advantage of these web sites.  After the state’s 
discriminatory law was repealed and in-state distributors and retailers faced 
out-of-state competition, wine prices at brick-and-mortar stores declined up 
to 40% relative to prices offered by online retailers.  The authors conclude 
that the elimination of these regulations increased consumer welfare. 
[N]ot just by facilitating entry by out-of-state sellers, but also by 
placing competitive pressure on the in-state sellers.  More 
broadly speaking, this result clearly supports theories that predict 
how government mandated market restrictions inhibit 
competition and facilitate higher prices, and how the removals of 
those bans will facilitate more efficient market outcomes.85 
B. Wireless telephony 
A centralized commercial policy is especially important in industries 
that are characterized by economies of scale—industries that can offer 
consumers lower prices or higher quality products as firms grow larger 
while earning the same or greater profit.  The wireless telephony industry, 
like many other industries facing economies of scale, favors larger firms.86 
Consumers clearly place great value on the ability to access their carrier’s 
network anywhere in the country.  Thus, carriers with national networks 
had a significant competitive advantage as they offered consumers a 
superior product (free nationwide roaming).  Before 1994, states and the 
federal government had concurrent power to regulate the services that 
wireless carriers offered to consumers; some states such as California and 
New York imposed price controls on the nascent industry.87 However, in 
1994, the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) preempted the state 
laws regulating wireless telephony.  As in the wine example above, the 
 
 85. Id. at 29. 
 86. It bears noting that the banking industry is also characterized by significant 
economies of scale.  See Allen N. Berger, et al., Competition from Large, Multimarket 
Firms and the Performance of Small, Single-Market Firms:  Evidence from the Banking 
Industry, 39 J. MONEY, CREDIT AND BANKING 331, 332 (Mar.-Apr. 2007) (arguing that 
technological advances “may have also allowed multimarket banks to offer higher quality 
services to consumers—in the form of large branch and ATM networks, for instance—
thereby putting greater competitive pressure on smaller, less geographically diversified 
banks.”); Gregory Elliehausen, Staff, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, 
Washington DC, The Cost of Bank Regulation:  A Review of the Evidence, FRB STAFF 
STUDY 171 (Apr. 1998), at 25-27 (discussing whether regulatory costs in the banking 
industry exhibit economies of scale). 
 87.  Thomas W. Hazlett, Is Federal Preemption Efficient in Cellular Phone 
Regulation?, 56 FED. COMM. L.J. 155, 157 (2003) (discussing the Omnibus Budget 
Reconciliation Act of 1993, 47 U.S.C. § 332(c)(3)(A) (2000), which revoked states' 
authority to “regulate the entry of or the rates charged by any commercial mobile service or 
any private mobile service.”). 
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FCC created a “natural experiment” that economists were able to use to 
evaluate the effects of a change in policy.  Thomas Hazlett, currently a 
Professor of Law and Economics at George Mason University, undertook a 
comprehensive review of the literature concerning the effects of the FCC’s 
preemption of state regulation.88  Professor Hazlett’s review demonstrates 
that the change in regulatory oversight toward uniform, national standards 
unquestionably increased economic efficiency.  Before deregulation, 
consumers in states that regulated wireless telephony, such as California 
and New York, paid more.  Furthermore, state regulations discouraged 
rivals wireless providers from entering the market and slowed consumer 
adoption of cellular phones.  Just as balkanized state laws hindered the 
growth of wireless networks and raised cellular prices for everyone, 
balkanized state laws stymied the growth of ATM and branch networks,89 
and thereby raise the cost of credit and banking services for consumers. 
IV. POLICY IMPLICATIONS 
Based on our findings above, we offer two concrete policy 
implications for financial regulators and policymakers.  New regulations 
are sorely needed to avoid repeating consumer harm that helped contribute 
to the credit crisis, but myriad competing sets of new regulations will likely 
create more economic harm than good. 
A. Elimination of preemption would generate significant social cost 
 Eliminating preemption for national banks is an inefficient way to 
achieve the worthy objective of protecting consumers.  A careful review of 
the evidence indicates that preemption has been an important policy tool 
for opening up markets and increasing competition, leading to benefits for 
banks and their customers.  Eliminating preemption would create a 
complex regulatory environment where banks are forced to operate under a 
patchwork of state regulations.  At the very least, disparate standards would 
impose significant compliance costs on banks seeking to operate across 
state lines.  The experience with Sarbanes-Oxley regulation has shown the 
burden of such compliance costs would be most difficult for small to mid-
size banks operating in multiple states.90  As the wine and wireless 
 
 88.  Id. at 205-221. 
 89.  Berger, supra note 86, at 337 (“The literature suggests that consumers value dense 
branch networks, both locally and over larger geographic areas.”). 
 90.  Sarbanes-Oxley imposed significant auditing requirements on publicly traded 
companies.  The GAO, among other sources, has found that such regulation is particularly 
burdensome for small companies.  GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, Sarbanes-Oxley 
Act:  Consideration of Key Principles Needed in Addressing Implementation for Smaller 
Public Companies, Report to S. Comm. on Small Business and Entrepreneurship, GAO-06-
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examples show, a sufficiently complex thicket of varying regulations could 
undermine banks incentives to operate across state lines.  Under this 
scenario, banking customers would undoubtedly face higher prices as 
banks would no longer enjoy the cost-efficiencies associated with 
economies of scale. 
Furthermore, many state regulations that have ostensibly been passed 
to protect consumers have in reality been protectionist measures that favor 
entrenched local political interests at the expense of consumers.  State 
regulations are more likely than federal regulations to turn protectionist or 
otherwise be economically inefficient because a state regulator does not 
internalize the costs that protectionist measures impose on banks that 
operate both inside and outside of that state; nor does that regulator 
internalize the costs that such measures impose on the customers of those 
same banks who reside outside of the state.  For example, a bank’s inflated 
costs associated with conforming to myriad state rules or being denied 
certain economies of scale as a result of entry restrictions will not fully 
redound to the harm of residents within the state that issues a protectionist 
measure; those costs are spread throughout the banking system.  Although 
a state regulator should, in theory, internalize the cost of bank customers 
inside of the state, in practice, state regulators can become unduly 
influenced by local interests that seek to protect their business from 
competition to the detriment of banking customers. 
Historical state-level prohibitions against branching and other forms 
of entry—which were subsequently reversed by preemptive Federal 
legislation—were clearly motivated by protectionist concerns.  For these 
reasons, a national regulator of banks engaging in multi-state activities 
plays a crucially important role in the banking industry.  Because the 
national regulator can internalize the positive spillover effects associated 
with greater competition and enhanced economies of scope and scale, and 
because the national regulator is less influenced by local business interests, 
the scope and extent of banking regulation will look very different than that 
chosen by fifty disparate state regulators.  Hence, without preemption there 
would be no federal check on state regulators and legislatures who have 
been “captured” by local interests like insurance companies, and costly 
protectionist measures would undoubtedly proliferate. 
B. Creation of new federal rules for problem areas 
The economic evidence also demonstrates that preemption is not 
responsible for the consumer-protection failures associated with predatory 
lending and the subprime crisis.  Our analysis indicates that the vast 
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majority of subprime loans were originated by lenders outside of the 
banking system’s regulatory apparatus.  This fact does not mean that there 
is no need for increased consumer-protection measures—the rash of 
abusive lending practices that have come to light certainly require a 
concerted regulatory response.  It bears noting that preemption is not the 
same as non-regulation.  Preemption has been used to open markets and to 
simplify regulatory compliance, but it does not free banks from federal 
regulation, or even state-level regulations that do not conflict with federal 
law.  Furthermore, predatory lending is not restricted to a few specific 
regional locales, but rather is a national problem.  Thus, the optimal public 
policy solution is uniform regulation at the federal level, which could 
largely come from existing federal regulators. 
In summary, to address the gaps that were painfully exposed by the 
2008-09 financial crisis, new federal regulations are likely needed.  But 
those potentially more stringent regulations should be uniformly imposed 
across the nation, so that banks and their customers can continue to reap the 
benefits of common regulatory standards. 
CONCLUSION 
 Critics of preemption have focused on the straw-man issue of the 
subprime mortgage crisis while ignoring the empirical evidence that 
preemption has increased economic efficiency and consumer welfare.  
When considered from an economic perspective, consumer protection and 
preemption are not contrary policies, but rather are different means of 
ensuring that financial markets function to maximize the value of the 
banking services available to consumers.  When markets are competitive, 
increasing the operating cost of firms through a patchwork of state 
regulation will result in higher prices for consumers.  Likewise, protecting 
high-cost firms in a given state from competition against more efficient 
(out-of-state) firms will result in higher prices for consumers.  These 
conclusions are supported by a wide body of economic research and 
empirical analysis.  Indeed, our discussion probably understates the 
benefits of preemption policy because it is likely that many ill-advised state 
regulations were deterred by the fact that state legislators and regulators 
were aware that unduly burdensome state laws would be preempted. 
Nonetheless, it bears emphasis that we do not oppose increased 
financial regulation to protect consumers.  Indeed, it is clear that in certain 
instances mortgage lenders took advantage of ill-informed consumers in the 
interest of making short-term profits.  However, protecting consumers does 
not require policymakers to eviscerate the framework of Federal  banking 
regulation that has provided a substantial basis for banking industry 
stability and economic growth since 1863.  Indeed, it would be counter-
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productive to revise those aspects of banking regulation that currently 
benefit consumers under the guise of “consumer protection.”  Preemption 
may be the status-quo, but this does not implicate it as a cause of the 
financial crisis or as bad public policy.  Rather, the evidence indicates that 
preemption has increased the efficiency and quality of our banking system 
over time, and should remain a cornerstone of bank policy. 
